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TWO MODERN ANTITRUST MOMENTS:
A COMMENT ON FENTON AND KWOKA
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
The thoughtful and convincing articles by Kathryn Fenton' and John
Kwoka 2 each bring alive an interesting moment in antitrust history at
the Federal Trade Commission. At both times, the scope and durability
of antitrust's Chicago School revolution was in question. My comment
highlights the way two Commissions, more than a decade apart, ad-
dressed that revolution.
The FTC's decision concerning the General Motors/Toyota produc-
tion joint venture was issued early in 1984,1 a time of significant uncer-
tainty for horizontal restraints law. The joint venture was under review
early during antitrust law's transition from the structural to the Chicago
School era.4 By 1984, the Supreme Court had decided three cases now
considered important Chicago School landmarks: GTE Sylvania,5 Bruns-
wick,6 and BM!7 At the time, however, it would have been easy to question
how far the changes in antitrust doctrine would go and how permanent
they would be. BMJ had introduced an efficiency screen into the tradi-
tional per se prohibition against price fixing, but that decision had been
followed by Maricopa,8 which could have been read as restricting that
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.
I Kathryn M. Fenton, GM/Toyota: Twenty Years Later, supra this issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
1013 (2005).
2John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Federal Trade Commission and the Professions: A Quarter Century
of Accomplishment and Some New Challenges, supra this issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 997 (2005).
3 Gen. Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984).
4 During the late 1970s and 1980s the courts modified or discarded many antitrust
doctrines adopted during the mid-20th century (antitrust policy's structural era) in favor
of the doctrines advocated by lawyers and economists associated with the University of
Chicago. For a brief survey of these doctrinal changes, see generally Jonathan B. Baker,
A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust in POST CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS,
60-75 (Roger van den Bergh et al. eds., 2002).
5 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
6 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
7 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
8 Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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limitation on the application of the per se rule to settings like that in
BMI, in which the horizontal agreement was necessary to create a valu-
able new product.9 The breadth of BM/ arguably was not truly evident
until BM/ was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in NCAA,' 0 which did
not occur until shortly after the FIC issued its decision on the GM/
Toyota joint venture.
The GM/Toyota joint venture was not evaluated under Sherman Act
Section 1, the statute at issue in BM, but under the tougher incipiency
standard of Clayton Act Section 7.11 In the review of horizontal mergers
under Clayton Section 7, the structural presumption of Philadelphia
National Bank1 2 still controlled, although it too had begun to erode.
1 3
Horizontal joint venture analysis under that statute was then governed
by the Supreme Court's Penn-OlinH4 decision of 1964 and the FTC's
Yamaha/Brunswick decision, upheld on appeal in 1981.15 These joint
venture precedents emphasized a structural era concern with the loss
of potential competition between the venturers. But they were coming
under pressure from what were potentially fundamental shifts in horizon-
tal restraints and horizontal merger doctrines.
The antitrust doctrine dimension of the fight in GM/Toyota was over
how much antitrust policy should change in response to criticisms from
Chicago-oriented commentators that the existing rules unduly discour-
aged procompetitive conduct. When GM/Toyota was decided, that ques-
tion was being passionately contested, and its resolution was not yet
clear.16
9 Maricopa was difficult to distinguish from BM! and could even have been viewed as
limiting BM/ to its facts.
10 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
11 The Clayton Act's objection to mergers that may substantially lessen competition was
treated by the Supreme Court as "authority for arresting mergers at a time when the trend
to a lessening of competition was in its incipiency." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
12 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
13 United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). It may not have been
apparent that General Dynamics would permit a wide-ranging analysis of whether market
shares accurately reflect the merging firms' ability to compete, before the DOJ, under the
leadership of Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter, revised the DOJ's Merger
Guidelines in 1982. The influence of those guidelines is explored in William Blumenthal,
Clear Agency Guidelines: Lessons from 1982, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 5 (2000).
"4 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
5 Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981).
16 This contest of ideas was not simply a matter of partisan politics. Each camp included
Commissioners from both parties. Republican Chairman James C. Miller III, Republican
Terry Calvani, and Democrat George W. Douglas formed the Commission majority; Repub-
lican Patricia P. Bailey and Democrat Michael Pertschuk dissented.
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Those who viewed GM/Toyota from the well-established structural per-
spective saw an easy case for enforcement. 17 The automobile industry
was considered a tight oligopoly, with GM as its price leader. Entry
was difficult, and import competition from Japan was limited by trade
agreement. The proposed venture joined the first and fourth leading
firms selling passenger cars in the U.S. market. GM had picked Toyota,
the largest Japanese automaker, as its partner, even though GM was
already a part owner of Isuzu, a smaller Japanese firm with which it
could have partnered. GM and Toyota agreed to make small cars together
when they could have competed to make them. And theirjoint manufac-
turing venture would put them in a position to exchange competitively
sensitive information about costs, product design, and sales, thus, poten-
tially, facilitating continued oligopolistic pricing, even if the firms mar-
keted separately the cars the venture would produce.
Alternatively, those who took the rising Chicago School perspective
were unwilling to presume that large firms in concentrated markets
necessarily would achieve higher-than-competitive prices. They were also
attentive to the many possibilities for achieving cost-savings and other
efficiencies from collaboration, even if the collaboration was between
rivals. From this perspective, GM/Toyota was also an easy case.' 8 GM had
been unsuccessful at making inexpensive, high-quality, small cars and
wanted to learn how to do so from a successful firm. Toyota had achieved
great success as an importer, but could not bring in more small cars
because of trade restraints and was reluctant to build assembly plants
in the United States without first obtaining domestic manufacturing
experience. The joint venture thus promised to help GM become a
better producer of small cars and to make Toyota a better domestic
competitor, able to expand sales more easily by producing in the United
States. Moreover, competitive dangers were limited because the joint
venture involved only one plant.
As a practical matter, the FTC's decision was a victory for the Chicago
School. The FTC technically found a violation of Clayton Section 7, but
it allowed the joint venture to proceed, subject to restrictions on the
size of the venture and the information the firms could share. By framing
the venture as a violation that needed fixing, the FTC found a way to
harmonize a wide-ranging analysis of competitive effects and attention
to efficiencies within the pre-existing emphasis of the case law on pre-
sumptions of harm from concentrated market structure. As Kathyrn
17 See generally Gen. Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 393 (1984) (Bailey, Comm'r,
dissenting).
's See generally id. at 386 (Statement of Chairman Miller).
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Fenton notes, this decision seemed to come from a different era than
the FTC's Yamaha/Brunswick joint venture decision three years earlier. 9
With Terry Calvani's appointment as Commissioner the year before and
this decision, the FTC firmly embraced the economic approach to anti-
trust advocated by Chicago School commentators.
Fenton also emphasizes that the harm to automobile market competi-
tion feared by the structuralists in 1984 has not come to pass. Evaluating
the case with the benefit of hindsight, I agree with John Kwoka's view
in a book chapter he wrote on the GM/Toyota case: the risks to automobile
industry competition in retrospect appear to have been overstated but
so were the efficiency gains.20 I suspect that GM picked the wrong joint
venture partner to learn most efficiently how to make small cars cheaply.
21
GM would likely have learned more from partnering with Nissan, a
large Japanese automaker nearly as productive as Toyota. Learning from
Nissan would have been easier because Nissan achieved productivity
gains while organizing its production process the same way as GM, plan-
ning long production runs to achieve scale economies. By contrast,
Toyota organized its production process in a way fundamentally different
from GM, using small production lots to achieve flexibility and facilitate
continuous improvement.
The primary legacy of the FTC's GM/Toyota decision is the agency's
embrace of the economic approach championed by the Chicago School.
This approach to antitrust enforcement and policy has captured the
antitrust playing field to the point where Kathryn Fenton can reasonably
suggest that antitrust lawyers and economists now entering the field
likely find this once-controversial decision entirely unremarkable.
22
Over the decade that followed the GM/Toyota decision, the Supreme
Court completed its reconstruction of antitrust doctrine along Chicago
School lines. The shift in perspective often had bipartisan support,
although that was least true during the second term of the Reagan
administration, when the antitrust enforcement agencies flirted with less
mainstream non-interventionism. 23 The arrival of the Clinton administra-
tion marked the return of Democrats to the Executive Branch for the
19 Fenton, supra note 1, at 1014.
20John E. Kwoka, Jr., International Joint Venture: General Motors and Toyota, in THE ANTI-
TRUST REVOLUTION 46, 76 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).
21 See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Fringe Firms and Incentives to Innovate, 63 ANTITRUST
L.J. 621 (1995).
2 Fenton, supra note 1, at 1013, 1027.
21 See generallyJonathan B. Baker, Competition as a Political Bargain 31-45 (unpublished
manuscript Jan. 16, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=649442.
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first time since 1981. This moment in antitrust history promised to begin
to reveal what was partisan and what was permanent in antitrust policy's
Chicago School revolution. At the FTC the question was: where would
Chairman Robert Pitofsky accept the changes in antitrust and where
would he push back? This issue arose, among other places, in the FTC's
decision in California Dental,24 a primary subject of John Kwoka's article.
The California Dental case addressed advertising restrictions imposed
by a state dental association. Members agreed to abide by a Code of
Ethics prohibiting false and misleading advertising, and the association
issued a number of advisory opinions interpreting the Code provision.
The FTC concluded that the resulting advertising restrictions had the
practical effect of discouraging competition on the basis of price (by
preventing discounters from advertising that fact) and service quality
(by preventing dentists from advertising "gentle care" or a one-year
guarantee).
From an economic perspective, the theory pursued by the FTC could
be viewed as attacking a method the dentists used to police a cartel. The
FTC's legal theory was that the advertising restrictions constituted a
horizontal agreement in restraint of trade. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court found that the facts found by the FTC were not sufficient to
reject the alternative hypothesis: these advertising restrictions promoted
competition by discouraging unscrupulous dentists from exploiting unin-
formed consumers through deceptive advertising claims.
Chairman Robert Pitofsky's approach to analyzing the dental associa-
tion's conduct was shaped by his extensive engagement with antitrust
enforcement, policy, and theory. Pitofsky is an accomplished anti-
trust academic and practitioner, with an unparalleled knowledge of
antitrust and its history. He understands the long line of antitrust prece-
dents as a continuous evolution, and synthesizes recent decisions with
older ones by identifying their common core. Pitofsky accepts the mod-
ern emphasis on efficiencies as a healthy corrective and championed
the clarification of the role of efficiencies in horizontal merger analysis
while Chairman of the FTC.25 Nevertheless, he also emphasizes the impor-
24 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 121 F.T.C. 190 (1996), affd, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997),
rev'd, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). Although I worked for Chairman Pitofsky at the FTC as Director
of the Bureau of Economics, I did not work on this matter. Pitofsky and I arrived at the
FTC only two months before the Administrative Law Judge issued his initial decision in
the case. There was no role for the Bureau of Economics in the review of that decision
by the Commission or the subsequent review in the courts. Accordingly, my interpretation
of the FTC's California Dentalcase is that of an academic observer, not that of a participant.
25 See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4
(1997), available at http://wwv.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.
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tance of making sure that efficiencies are demonstrated, rather than
merely assumed, and ensuring that in the contemporary enthusiasm for
efficiencies core antitrust principles are not discarded.
From this perspective, one key feature of the FITC's California Dental
decision, which Chairman Pitofsky authored, was its insistence on making
a clear distinction between per se rules and rule of reason analysis. This
is also a theme of the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, issued by
both federal enforcement agencies later during Chairman Pitofsky's
term. 26 His likely goal was to protect the per se prohibition against naked
price fixing from erosion in the hands of those who presume efficiencies
everywhere. Pitofsky worried that the FTC's earlier decision in Mass.
Board27-to which the Commission arguably returned in Polygram (Three
Tenors) 2 8-came closer to viewing all truncated analyses under Sherman
Act Section 1 as on a continuum and, consequently, that the Mass. Board
precendent would provide less protection against doctrinal erosion than
would a clear demarcation between per se rules and the rule of reason.
The Supreme Court's later decision in California Dental29 was a missed
opportunity to clarify the doctrinal status of truncated (quick look)
rules. The resulting uncertainty, which we must live with today, recalls
Chairman Pitofsky's concern that per se rules should be preserved against
erosion. The Court seems clear that at least some quick look approaches
are acceptable in theory, but the majority provides little guidance as to
when they may be employed in practice. The Court merely calls for "an
enquiry meet for the case. ' 30 In the wake of this decision, it is difficult
to know when the government can risk resting on a facial analysis of the
restraint or evidence of its actual effects (one quick look approach to
condemnation), or on a showing that a plausible efficiency proffered by
defendants is not valid after more searching inquiry (another type of
quick look to condemn), without contesting market definition (as would
be required for a more extensive reasonableness analysis),. l Nor do
defendants know when they can rest on proof that they lack market power
2
6 Federal Trade Comm'n & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collabora-
tions Among Competitors (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdoj
guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines for Collaborations].
27 Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988).
28 Polygram Holding, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9298, slip op. (July 24, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/d9298.htm.
- 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
30 Id. at 781. See id. at 779 ("Had the Court of Appeals engaged in a painstaking discussion
in a league with Justice Breyer's (compare his 14 pages with the Ninth Circuit's 8), and
had it confronted the comparability of these restrictions to bars on clearly verifiable
advertising, its reasoning might have sufficed to justify its conclusion.").
31 On types of quick looks to condemn or exonerate, see generally Guidelines for
Collaborations, supra note 26, § 3.3; ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KoVAcIC &JONATHAN B.
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(a quick look approach to exoneration), without proving efficiencies or
the absence of actual harmful effects (as would be required for a more
extensive reasonableness analysis). To the extent that the applicability
of these truncated approaches to horizontal restraints analysis under the
rule of reason is unclear, both parties may be led to insist on developing
a full factual record in all horizontal agreement cases outside the most
naked restraints. The government will then investigate such cases, and
the parties will litigate them, as if they will be decided under an unstruc-
tured rule of reason.
Like per se rules, quick look rules are closer to bright line rules
than to unstructured standards. Accordingly, Pitofsky's concern about
protecting per se rules has an analogue when quick look rules are at
stake: if the quick look rules are viewed as on a continuum, without
clearly demarcated categories-as the Supreme Court's "enquiry meet
for the case" formulation seems to suggest-how can courts preserve
the benefits of truncated analyses in providing guidance as to the legal
rules and in reducing the transaction costs of litigation?32
This problem is more difficult in the quick look context than in the
per se rule setting addressed by Pitofsky. For the most part, courts,
counselors, enforcers, and commentators have a common understanding
of what falls in the category of "naked" horizontal restraints-agreements
tantamount to price fixing or market division among rivals with no
plausible efficiency justification. By contrast, there is less consensus as
to when conduct outside traditional per se categories should be con-
demned or exonerated without detailed analysis. One unresolved ques-
tion involves the probative value of actual effect evidence, whether direct
evidence of harm to competition or immediate (facial) inference from
the nature of the restraint. How convincing must such evidence of actual
effect be before it makes sense to proceed without defining markets and,
consequently, also without evaluating whether shares are high enough
to make harm to competition likely (as would be required in a more
complete reasonableness review)? The Supreme Court has some experi-
ence in making such judgments, but it is far from clear why a limited
factual showing of actual effect was sufficient to support a quick look
condemnation in NCAA33 and Indiana Federation of Dentists3 4 but not in
California Dental.
BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION
POLICY 196-201 (2002).
" These are the general benefits of bright line rules. Unstructured standards, by contrast,
can be attractive notwithstanding loss of these benefits, to the extent they reduce error
costs in doctrinal application.
11 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
31 FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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Another unresolved problem involves the hierarchy of quick look
approaches. A plaintiff might argue that a particular practice would have
been treated as a naked restraint, and held illegal per se, were it not for
the plausibility of the defendants' efficiency justification. Consequently,
the plaintiff might argue, this justification should be the only issue
requiring detailed evaluation, as a demonstration of its invalidity would
led to a quick condemnation of the conduct. Defendants in the same
case might argue simultaneously that they collectively account for so
small a share of the market as to make anticompetitive effects implausible
and, thus, that their conduct should be quickly exonerated. Under such
circumstances, which of the two proposed quick look approaches, if
either, should a court employ?
The FTC's California Dental opinion thus provided the springboard
for a Supreme Court opinion that raised more questions about quick
look rules than it answered. The subsequent history of the FTC's case
confirms Chairman Pitofsky's concern about the difficulty of protecting
doctrinal understandings absent clear and simple "bright line" rules.
More broadly, Chairman Pitofsky's California Dental opinion for the
FTC illustrates his ability to tack when the winds shifted to blow from a
Chicago direction, without allowing the antitrust vessel to be diverted
from the course determined by longstanding core principles of competi-
tion policy. Pitofsky was willing to accept movement in horizontal
restraints doctrine to incorporate greater sympathy for efficiencies but
only if he could be confident that the fundamental bar against naked
price fixing was not compromised.3 5 When Pitofsky addressed antitrust's
Chicago School revolution, in short, he saw the value in reforming prior
doctrines, so long as reform did not threaten fundamental antitrust
prohibitions.
3 6
Both of these antitrust moments were distinguished by the FTC's
incorporation of developments in economic thinking. In reviewing the
GM/Toyotajoint venture, Chairman Miller assimilated the lesson taught
in Chicago by insisting on the importance of weighing procompetitive
35 Pitofsky adopted a similar strategy in spearheading the efficiency revisions of the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued jointly by the FTC and the DOJ. See 1 FTC STAFF,
ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE ch. 2 (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc-vl.pdf.
(describing the general approach later followed in Guidelines revisions).
36 Pitofsky's program alternatively could be described in positive terms as restoring
the antitrust agenda, for example by investigating potential violations in areas such as
anticompetitive exclusion, where governmental enforcement of core prohibitions had
become less frequent during the fifteen years before he became FTC Chairman.
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benefits against threats to competition and on evaluating those benefits
with sympathy for the ability of firms to achieve efficiencies through
collaboration. In evaluating advertising restrictions among providers of
professional services a decade later, Chairman Pitofsky took for granted
then-recent economic learning about the role of reputation and advertis-
ing in addressing potential market failures arising from asymmetries
in information between sellers and buyers.37 These developments in
economics arose when modern microeconomic theory was transformed
by applying game-theoretic arguments to settings with imperfect infor-
mation. These same developments in economics have also led to con-
temporary post-Chicago economic critiques of the Supreme Court's
reconstruction of antitrust law along Chicago School lines.38 Accordingly,
it is no surprise that around the same time the Pitofsky FTC handed
down California Dental, the Commission was also taking seriously theories
of anticompetitive harm-notably the threat of anticompetitive exclu-
sion and the potential for mergers to generate unilateral effects-about
which Chicago School partisans have been skeptical.
The FTC was not the only institutional actor participating in the
development of antitrust policy during the two antitrust moments high-
lighted by Kathryn Fenton and John Kwoka. It is well-known that the
FTC's movement in a Chicago-oriented direction in 1984 paralleled
steps taken by the DOJ and the courts. By contrast, it is too early to
gauge the influence of Robert Pitofsky's program to accept efficiency-
oriented reforms while simultaneously protecting the core of antitrust
doctrine.3 9 Still, the FTC has established itself as an influential anti-
trust actor, in part, through its significant participation in the develop-
ment of antitrust doctrine and policy during these modem antitrust
moments.
31 See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. 190, 296 (1996) (citing to economic and policy
literature on the marketplace role of advertising, both generally and in the context of
occupational regulation). These references are limited; the Commission's opinion does
not incorporate a detailed economic analysis comparable to what John Kwoka provides
in his article, apparently because the case was tried under a per se theory, without economic
testimony as to the marketplace effects of the restrictions on professional advertising. See
Kwoka, supra note 2, at 1008 & 1009 n.30.
m See generally Baker, supra note 4, at 60-75.
39 For example, the appropriate scope of concern with exclusion has been the subject
of three decades of debate prompted by Chicago School criticisms. The outcome in one
prominent federal court case is nevertheless consistent with Pitofsky's program of protect-
ing the core of antitrust doctrine in this area against erosion. In high-profile litigation
seemingly involving every important institutional actor in antitrust enforcement other than
the FrC, longstanding prohibitions on anticompetitive exclusion have been reaffirmed by
the D.C. Circuit. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The
unanimous en banc panel included conservative antitrust expert Douglas Ginsburg.
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